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INTRODUCTION
With the onset of the Information Age, our nation is becoming
increasingly dependent on network communications. Computer-based
technology is impacting significantly our ability to access, store, and
distribute information. Among the most important uses of this
technology is electronic commerce: performing financial transactions via
electronic information exchanged over telecommunications lines. A
key requirement for electronic commerce is the development of
secure and efficient electronic payment systems. The need for
security is highlighted by the rise of the Internet, which promises to
be a leading medium for future electronic commerce.
Electronic payment systems come in many forms including digital
checks, debit cards, credit cards, and stored value cards ("SVC"). The
usual security features for such systems are privacy (protection from
eavesdropping), authenticity (identification and message integrity),
and nonrepudiation (prevention of later denying having performed
a transaction).
This Essay focuses on electronic cash. As the name implies,
electronic cash is an attempt to construct an electronic payment
system modelled after our paper money system. Paper money has
such features as: portability (easily carried); recognizability (as legal
tender), and thus readily acceptable; transferability (without involve-
ment of the financial network); untraceability (no record of where
money is spent); anonymity (no record of who spent the money); and
the ability to make "change." The designers of electronic cash
focused on preserving the features of untraceability and anonymity.
Thus, electronic cash is defined to be an electronic payment system
that provides, in addition to the above security features, the properties
of user anonymity and payment untraceability.
Electronic cash schemes that use digital signatures' to achieve
1. Editors' Note: Fora thoughtful discussion of digital signatures, see Randy V. Sabett,
International Harmonization in Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data Interchanga A Prposed I-rst
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security and anonymity are worrisome from a law enforcement
perspective because of the anonymity feature. In particular, the
dangers of money laundering and counterfeiting with electronic cash
are potentially far more serious than with paper money. The
widespread use of electronic cash would increase the vulnerability of
the national financial system to "information warfare" attacks.2 This
Essay discusses measures to manage the risks associated with electronic
cash; these safeguards, however, will have the effect of limiting user
anonymity.
Part I defines the basic concepts surrounding electronic payment
systems and electronic cash. Part II provides the reader with a high-
level cryptographic description of electronic cash protocols in terms
of basic authentication mechanisms. Part III describes specific
existing implementations. The optional features of transferability and
divisibility for off-line electronic cash are presented in Part IV. Part
V discusses the security issues associated with electronic cash. Finally,
this Essay concludes with a summary of the risks that are magnified
by the presence of anonymity in electronic payment systems.
I. WHAT IS ELECTRONIC CASH?
The term "electronic cash" often is applied to any electronic
payment scheme that superficially resembles money. In fact, however,
electronic cash is a specific kind of electronic payment scheme,
defined by certain cryptographic properties.
A. Electronic Payment
The term electronic commerce refers to any financial transaction
involving the electronic transmission of information. The packets of
information being transmitted commonly are called electronic tokens.
One should not confuse the token, which is a sequence of bits, with
the physical media used to store and transmit the information.
The storage medium generally is referred to as a "card" because it
usually takes the form of a wallet-sized card made of plastic or
cardboard. Two obvious examples are credit cards and ATM cards.
However, the "card" also could be a computer memory.
An electronic payment is a particular kind of electronic commerce.
An electronic payment protocol involves a series of transactions,
resulting in a payment being made using a token issued by a third
Step Toward Signing on the Digital Dotted Line, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 511 (1996).
2. See CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 49 (Kenneth W.
Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996).
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party. The most common example is the electronic approval process
used to complete a credit card transaction; neither payer nor payee
issues the token in an electronic payment.
3
The electronic payment scenario assumes three kinds of players:4
" a payer or consumer ("Alice"),
" a payee, such as a merchant ("Bob"), and
" a financial network with whom both Alice and Bob have accounts
(the "Bank").
B. Security of Electronic Payments
With the rise of telecommunications and the Internet, it is
increasingly common that electronic commerce takes place using a
transmission medium not under the control of the financial system.
It therefore is necessary to take steps to ensure the security of the
messages sent along such a medium.
The necessary security properties are:
* Privacy, or protection against eavesdropping, which is important for
transactions involving information such as credit card numbers sent
on the Internet.
" User identification, or protection against impersonation.
" Message integrity, or protection against tampering or substitution,
which ensures that the recipient's copy of the message is the same
as what the sender sent.
" Nonrepudiation, or protection against later denial of a transaction.
The last three properties collectively are referred to as authenticity.
These security features can be achieved in several ways. One
technique that is gaining widespread use is the establishment of an
authentication infrastructure. In such a setup, privacy is attained by
encrypting each message using a private key known only to the sender
and the recipient. Authenticity is attained via key management, that
is, the system of generating, distributing, and storing the users' keys.
Key management is carried out using a certification authority or a
trusted agent who is responsible for confirming a user's identity.
Certification is conducted for each user (including banks) who is
issued a digital identity certificate. The certificate can be used
whenever the user wishes to identify himself or herself to another
user. Such certificates make it possible to set up a private key
between users in a secure and authenticated way. The private key
3. In this sense, electronic payment differs from such systems as prepaid phone cards
and subway fare cards, in which the token is issued by the payee.
4. Part IVA generalizes this scenario in a discussion of transferability.
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then is used to encrypt subsequent messages. This technique can be
implemented to provide any or all of the above security features.
Without a trusted certification authority and a secure authentication
infrastructure, those security features cannot be achieved, and
electronic commerce becomes impossible over an untrusted transmis-
sion medium.
The following discussion assumes that some authentication
infrastructure is in place providing the four security features.
C. Electronic Cash
This Essay has defined privacy as protection against eavesdropping
on one's communications. One privacy advocate, however, defines
the term far more expansively.' To David Chaum, genuine "privacy"
implies that one's history of purchases is not available for inspection
by banks and credit card companies, and by extension, the govern-
ment. To achieve this, one needs anonymity in addition to privacy.
In particular, one needs (1) payer anonymity during payment; and
(2) payment untraceability so that the bank cannot tell whose money
is used in a particular payment.
These features are not available with credit cards. Indeed, the only
conventional payment system offering these features is cash. Thus
Chaum and others have introduced electronic cash (or digital cash)
as an electronic payment system that offers both features.
The sequence of events in an electronic cash payment is as follows:
(1) withdrawal, in which Alice transfers some of her wealth from
her Bank account to her card;
(2) payment, in which Alice transfers money from her card to
Bob's; and
(3) deposit, in which Bob transfers the money he has received to
his Bank account.
These procedures can be implemented in either of two ways:
" On-line payment means that Bob calls the Bank and verifies the
validity of Alice's token' before accepting her payment and
delivering his merchandise. This resembles many of today's credit
card transactions.
" Off-line payment means that Bob submits Alice's electronic coin for
verification and deposit sometime after the payment transaction is
5. See generally David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Privacy, So. AM., Aug. 1992, at 96;
David Chaum, Security Without Identification: Transactions to Make Big Brother Obsolete, 28 ASS'N
COMPUTING MACHINERY 1030 (1985).
6. In the context of electronic cash, the token usually is called an electronic coin.
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completed. This method resembles making small purchases today
by personal check.




Figure 1. ie three types of transactions in a basic electronic cash model.
D. Counterfeiting
As in any payment system, there is a potential for criminal abuse,
with the intention either of cheating the financial system or of using
the payment mechanism to facilitate some other crime. Part V will
discuss criminal abuse further, but the issue of counterfeiting must be
considered here, as the payment protocols contain built-in protections
against it.
Two abuses of an electronic cash system are analogous to counter-
feiting of physical cash:
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" Token forgery, or creating a valid-looking coin without making a
corresponding Bank withdrawal.
" Multiple spending, or using the same token over again. Because an
electronic coin consists of digital information, it appears as valid
after it has been spent as it did before.
Counterfeiting can be addressed by prevention or by detection after
the fact in a way that identifies the culprit. Prevention clearly is
preferable.
Although it is tempting to imagine electronic cash systems in which
the transmission and storage media are secure, there certainly will be
applications where this is not the case. An obvious example is the
Internet, the users of which are notoriously vulnerable to viruses and
eavesdropping. Thus, techniques other than physical security must be
established to address counterfeiting.
" To protect against token forgery, one relies on the usual authentici-
ty functions of user identification and message integrity. Note that
the "user" being identified from the coin is the issuing Bank, not
the anonymous spender.
" To protect against multiple spending, the Bank maintains a
database of spent electronic coins. Coins already in the database
are to be rejected for deposit. If the payments are on-line, this will
prevent multiple spending. If the payments are off-line, detection
of multiple spending is the only available precaution. To protect
the payee, then, it is necessary to identify the payer. This means
that the anonymity mechanism in the case of multiple spending
must be disabled.
The features of authenticity, anonymity, and multiple-spender
exposure are achieved most conveniently using public-key cryptogra-
phy. Parts II and III will discuss how these features are accomplished
using public key cryptography.
II. A CRYPTOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION
Part II provides a high-level description of electronic cash protocols
in terms of basic authentication mechanisms.
A. Public-Key Cryptographic Tools
Part A begins by discussing the basic public-key cryptographic tech-
niques upon which the electronic cash implementations are based.
One-Way Functions. A one-way function is a correspondence between
two sets that can be computed efficiently in one direction but not the
other. In other words, the function is one-way if, given s in the
domain of c, it is easy to compute t = j (s), but given only t, it is hard
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to find s. (The elements are typically numbers, but also could be
points on an elliptic curve, for example. 7)
Key Pairs. If is a one-way function, then a key pair is a pair s, t
related in some way via . s is the secret key and t is the public key.
As the names imply, each user keeps his secret key to himself and
makes his public key available to all. The secret key remains secret
even when the public key is known, because the one-way property of
q insures that s cannot be computed from t.
All public-key protocols use key pairs. For this reason, public-key
cryptography often is called asymmetric cryptography, as opposed to
conventional cryptography, which often is called symmetric cryptogra-
phy, as one can both encrypt and decrypt with the private key but do
neither without it.
Signature and Identification. In a public key system, a user identifies
herself by proving that she knows her secret key without revealing it.
She does this by performing some operation using the secret key that
anyone can check or undo using the public key. This process is
called identification. If one uses a message as well as one's secret key,
one is performing a digital signature on the message. The digital
signature plays the same role as a handwritten signature: identifying
the author of the message in a way that cannot be repudiated and
confirming the integrity of the message.
Secure Hashing. A hash function is a map from all possible strings
of bits of any length to a bit string of fixed length. Such functions
often are required to be collision-free: that is, it must be
computationally difficult to find two inputs that hash to the same
value. If a hash function is both one-way and collision-free, it is said
to be a secure hash.
The most common use of secure hash functions is in digital
signatures. Messages might come in any size, but a given public-key
algorithm requires working in a set of fixed size. Thus one hashes the
message and signs the secure hash rather than the message itself.
The hash is required to be one-way to prevent signature forgery, that
is, constructing a valid-looking signature of a message without using
the secret key.' The hash must be collision-free to prevent repudia-
tion, or denial of having signed one message by producing another
message with the same hash.
7. SeeALFREDJ. MENEZES, ELLIPTIc CURVE PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSMsTEMS 13 (1993).
8. Note that token forgery is not the same thing as signature forgery. Forging the
Bank's digital signature without knowing its secret key is one way of committing token forgery,
but not the only way. A bank employee or hacker, for instance, could "borrow" the Bank's
secret key and validly sign a token. This key compromise scenario is discussed in Part V.C.
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B. A Simplified Electronic Cash Protocol
The example below is a simplified electronic cash system protocol,
without the anonymity features.
PROTOCOL 1: On-line electronic payment.
Withdrawal-
Alice sends withdrawal request to Bank.
Bank prepares electronic coin and digitally signs it.
Bank sends coin to Alice and debits her account.
Payment/Deposit
Alice gives Bob coin.
Bob contacts Bank' and sends coin.
Bank verifies Bank's digital signature.
Bank verifies that coin has not already been spent.
Bank consults its withdrawal records to confirm Alice's withdrawal.
(optional)
Bank enters coin in spent-coin database.
Bank credits Bob's account and informs Bob.
Bob gives Alice merchandise.
PROTOCOL 2: Off-line electronic payment.
Withdrawa:
Alice sends withdrawal request to Bank.
Bank prepares electronic coin and digitally signs it.
Bank sends coin to Alice and debits her account.
Payment
Alice gives Bob coin.
Bob verifies Bank's digital signature. (optional)
Bob gives Alice merchandise.
Deposit:
Bob sends coin to Bank.
Bank verifies Bank's digital signature.
Bank verifies that coin has not already been spent.
Bank consults its withdrawal records to confirm Alice's withdrawal.
(optional)
Bank enters coin in spent-coin database.
9. One should keep in mind that the term "Bank" refers to the financial system that
issues and clears the coins. For example, the Bank might be a credit card company, or the
overall banking system. In the latter case, Alice and Bob might have separate banks. If that is
so, then the "deposit" procedure is slightly more complicated: Bob's bank contacts Alice's bank,
"cashes in" the coin, and puts the money in Bob's account.
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Bank credits Bob's account
The above protocols use digital signatures to achieve authenticity.
Although the authenticity features could have been achieved in other
ways, digital signatures must be used to allow for the anonymity
mechanisms to be added in the following discussion.
C. Untraceable Electronic Payments
In Part C, the above protocols are modified to include payment
untraceability. To achieve untraceability, it is necessary that the Bank
not be able to link a specific withdrawal with a specific deposit."
This is accomplished using a special kind of digital signature called a
blind signature.
Examples of blind signatures are provided in Part III.B, but a high-
level description is given here. In the withdrawal step, the user
changes the message to be signed using a random quantity. This step
is called "blinding" the coin, and the random quantity is called the
blinding factor. The Bank signs this random-looking text, and the
user removes the blinding factor. The user now has a legitimate
electronic coin signed by the Bank. The Bank will see this coin when
it is submitted for deposit, but will not know who withdrew it because
the random blinding factors are unknown to the Bank. Obviously, it
no longer will be possible to check the withdrawal records, which was
an optional step in the first two protocols.
Note that the Bank does not know what it is signing in the
withdrawal step. This introduces the possibility that the Bank might
be signing something other than what it is intending to sign. To
prevent this, a Bank's digital signature by a given secret key is valid
only as authorizing a withdrawal of a fixed amount. For example, the
Bank could have one key for a $10 withdrawal, another for a $50
withdrawal, and so on."
PROTOCOL 3: Untraceable On-line electronic payment.
Withdrawa-
Alice creates electronic coin and blinds it.
Alice sends blinded coin to Bank with withdrawal request.
10. To achieve either anonymity feature, it is of course necessary that the pool of
electronic coins be a large one.
11. One also could broaden the concept of "blind signature" to include interactive
protocols in which both parties contribute random elements to the message to be signed. An
example of this is the "randomized blind signature" occurring in the Ferguson scheme discussed
in Part III.C.
1140
1997] CRYPTOGRAPHY OF ANONYMOUS ELECTRONIC CASH
Bank digitally signs blinded coin.
Bank sends signed blinded coin to Alice and debits her account.
Alice unblinds signed coin.
PaymentDeposit
Alice gives Bob coin.
Bob contacts Bank and sends coin.
Bank verifies Bank's digital signature.
Bank verifies that coin has not already been spent.
Bank enters coin in spent-coin database.
Bank credits Bob's account and informs Bob.
Bob gives Alice merchandise.
PROTOCOL 4: Untraceable Off-line electronic payment.
Withdrawa-
Alice creates electronic coin and blinds it.
Alice sends blinded coin to Bank with withdrawal request.
Bank digitally signs blinded coin.
Bank sends signed blinded coin to Alice and debits her account.
Alice unblinds signed coin.
Payment:
Alice gives Bob coin.
Bob verifies Bank's digital signature. (optional)
Bob gives Alice merchandise.
Deposit:
Bob sends coin to Bank.
Bank verifies Bank's digital signature.
Bank verifies that coin has not already been spent.
Bank enters coin in spent-coin database.
Bank credits Bob's account.
D. A Basic Electronic Cash Protocol
Part D takes the final step in modifying the protocols to achieve
payment anonymity. The ideal situation (from the point of view of
privacy advocates) is that neither payer nor payee should know the
identity of the other. This makes remote transactions using electronic
cash completely anonymous: no one knows where Alice spends her
money or who pays her.
Unfortunately, however, this level of anonymity is not possible:
there is no way in such a scenario for the consumer to obtain a signed
receipt. Thus, payer anonymity is all that can be achieved.
If the payment is to be on-line, Protocol 3, can be used (implement-
ed, of course, to allow for payer anonymity). In the off-line case,
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however, a new problem arises. If a merchant tries to deposit a
previously spent coin, he will be turned down by the Bank, but
neither will know who the multiple spender was, as she was anony-
mous. Thus, it is necessary for the Bank to be able to identify a
multiple spender.
The solution is for the payment step to require the payer to have,
in addition to her electronic coin, some sort of identifying informa-
tion that she is to share with the payee. This information is split in
such a way that any one piece reveals nothing about Alice's identity,
but any two pieces are sufficient to identify her fully.
This information is created during the withdrawal step. The
withdrawal protocol includes a step in which the Bank verifies that the
information is present and corresponds to Alice and to the particular
coin being created. To preserve payer anonymity, the Bank will not
actually see the information, but only verify that it is there. Alice
carries the information along with the coin until she spends it.
At the payment step, Alice must reveal one piece of this informa-
tion to Bob. Thus only Alice can spend the coin, as only she knows
the information. This revealing is done using a challenge-response
protocol. In such a protocol, Bob sends Alice a random "challenge"
quantity and, in response, Alice returns a piece of identifying
information. The challenge quantity determines which piece she
sends. At the deposit step, the revealed piece is sent to the Bank
along with the coin. If all steps proceed properly, the identifying
information never will point to Alice. Should she spend the coin
twice, however, the Bank eventually will obtain two copies of the same
coin, each with a piece of identifying information. Because of the
randomness in the challenge-response protocol, these two pieces will
be different. Thus the Bank will be able to identify her as the
multiple spender. Because only Alice can dispense identifying
information, it is clear that her coin was not copied and re-spent by
someone else.
PROTOCOL 5: Off-line cash.
Withdrawal:
Alice creates electronic coin, including identifying information.
Alice blinds coin.
Alice sends blinded coin to Bank with withdrawal request.
Bank verifies that identifying information is present.
Bank digitally signs blinded coin.
Bank sends signed blinded coin to Alice and debits her account.
Alice unblinds signed coin.
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Payment
Alice gives Bob coin.
Bob verifies Bank's digital signature.
Bob sends Alice challenge.
Alice sends Bob response (revealing one piece of identifying
information).
Bob verifies response.
Bob gives Alice merchandise.
Deposit.
Bob sends coin, challenge, and response to Bank.
Bank verifies Bank's digital signature.
Bank verifies that coin has not already been spent.
Bank enters coin, challenge, and response in spent-coin database.
Bank credits Bob's account.
Note that, in this protocol, Bob must verify the Bank's signature
before giving Alice the merchandise. In this way, Bob can be sure
that either he will be paid or he will learn Alice's identity as a
multiple spender.
Ii. PROPOSED OFF-LINE IMPLEMENTATIONS
Having described electronic cash in a high-level format, this Essay
now will describe the specific implementations that have been
proposed. These implementations will be given for the off-line case
only. The corresponding on-line protocols are just simplified versions
of those provided below.
A. Including Identifying Information
Part A explains more specifically how to include (and access when
necessary) the identifying information meant to catch multiple
spenders. There are two ways to accomplish this task: the cut-and-
choose method and zero-knowledge proofs.
Cut and Choose. When Alice wishes to make a withdrawal, she first
constructs and blinds a message consisting of K pairs of numbers,
where K is large enough that an event with probability 2K never will
happen in practice. These numbers have the property of enabling one
to identify Alice given both pieces of a pair; unmatched pieces remain
useless. Alice then obtains signature of this blinded message from the
Bank. This is done in such a way that the Bank can check that the K
pairs of numbers are present and that they have the required
properties despite the blinding.
When Alice spends her coins with Bob, his challenge to her is a
string of K random bits. For each bit, Alice sends the appropriate
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piece of the corresponding pair. For example, if the bit string starts
0110.... Alice sends the first piece of the first pair, the second piece
of the second pair, the second piece of the third pair, the first piece
of the fourth pair, etc. When Bob deposits the coin at the Bank, he
sends on these K pieces.
If Alice re-spends her coin, she is challenged a second time.
Because each challenge is a random bit string, the new challenge is
bound to disagree with the old one in at least one bit. Thus Alice will
have to reveal the other piece of the corresponding pair. When the
Bank receives the coin a second time, it takes the two pieces and
combines them to reveal Alice's identity.
Although conceptually simple, this scheme is not very efficient, as
each coin must be accompanied by 2K large numbers.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. The term zero-knowledge proof refers to any
protocol in public-key cryptography that proves knowledge of some
quantity without revealing it or making it any easier to find. In this
case, Alice creates a key pair such that the secret key points to her
identity. This is done in such a way that the Bank can check via the
public key that the secret key in fact reveals her identity, despite the
blinding. In the payment protocol, Alice gives Bob the public key as
part of the electronic coin. She then proves to Bob via a zero-
knowledge proof that she possesses the corresponding secret key. If
she responds to two distinct challenges, the identifying information
can be put together to reveal the secret key and thus her identity.
B. Authentication and Signature Techniques
Part B describes the digital signatures that have been used in
implementation of the above protocols and the techniques that have
been used to include identifying information.
Two kinds of digital signatures appear in electronic cash protocols.
Suppose the signer has a key pair and a message M to be signed.
, Digital Signature with Message Recovery. For this kind of signature,
there is a signing function SsK using the secret key SK, and a
verifying function VK using the public key PK These functions are
inverses, so that:
Equation 1: VPK (SsK (M)) = M
The function VK is easy to implement, but SsK is easy only if one
knows SK Thus Ss is said to have a trapdoor, or secret quantity
that makes it possible to perform a cryptographic computation
which is otherwise infeasible. The function VpK is called a trapdoor
one-way function, because it is a one-way function to anyone who
does not know the trapdoor.
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In this kind of scheme, the verifier receives the signed message
SsK(M) but not the original message text. The verifier then applies
the verification function VK. This step both verifies the identity of
the signer and, by using Equation 1, recovers the message text.
Digital Signature with Appendix. In this kind of signature, the signer
performs an operation on the message using his own secret key.
The result is taken to be the signature of the message, sent as an
attached appendix to the message text. The verifier checks an
equation involving the message, the appendix, and the signer's
public key. If the equation checks, the verifier knows that the
signer's secret key was used in generating the signature.
Specific algorithms are provided below.
RSA Signatures. The most well-known signature with message
recovery is the RSA signature. Let Nbe a hard-to-factor integer. The
secret signature key s and the public verification key v are exponents
with the property that
MW - M (mod N)
for all messages M. Given v, it is easy to find s if one knows the
factors of N, but difficult otherwise. Thus the " h power (mod )"
map is a trapdoor one-way function. The signature of M is
C:= M (mod N);
to recover the message (and verify the signature), one computes
M:= C' (mod N).
Blind RSA Signatures. The above scheme is easily blinded. Suppose
that Alice wants the Bank to produce a blind signature of the message
M. She generates a random number rand sends
?'M (mod N)
to the Bank to sign. The Bank does so, returning
r M (mod N).
Alice then divides this result by r. The result is M (mod N), the
Bank's signature of M, even though the Bank never has seen M.
The Schnorr Algorithms. The Schnorr family of algorithms includes
an identification procedure and a signature with appendix. These
algorithms are based on a zero-knowledge proof of possession of a
secret key. Let p and q be large prime numbers with q dividing p - 1.
Let g be a generator; that is, an integer between 1 and p such that
gq = 1 (mod p).
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Ifs is an integer (mod q), then the modular exponentiation operation
on s is
s): gs (modp).
The inverse operation is called the discrete logarithm function and is
denoted
logg t < t.
Ifp and q are chosen properly, then modular exponentiation is a one-
way function. That is, it is computationally infeasible to find a
discrete logarithm. Now suppose we have a line:
Equation 2. y = mx + b
over the field of integers (mod q). A line can be described by giving
its slope m and intercept b, but we will "hide" it as follows. Let
c = g (mod p),
n = gm (mod p).
Then c and n give us the "shadow" of the line under 4. Knowing c
and n does not give the slope or intercept of the line, but it does
enable us to determine whether a given point (x, y) is on the line. If
(x, y) satisfies Equation 2, then it also must satisfy the relation below:
Equation 3 e = n c (mod p).
Conversely, any point (x, y) satisfying Equation 3 must be on the line.
The relationship in Equation 3 can be checked by anyone, because it
involves only public quantities. Thus anyone can check whether a
given point is on the line, but points on the line can be generated
only by someone who knows the secret information. The basic
Schnorr protocol is a zero-knowledge proof that one possesses a given
secret quantity m. Let n be the corresponding public quantity.
Suppose one user (the "prover") wants to convince another (the
"verifier") that she knows m without revealing it. She does this by
constructing a line (Equation 2) and sending its shadow to the
verifier. The slope of the line is taken to be secret quantity m, and
the prover chooses the intercept at random, differently for each
execution of the protocol. The protocol then proceeds as follows:
Schnorr proof of possession:
(1) Alice sends c (and n if necessary) to Bob.
(2) Bob sends Alice a "challenge" value of x.
(3) Alice responds with the value of y such that (x, y) is on the
line.
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(4) Bob verifies via Equation 3 that (x, y) is on the line.
Bob now knows that he is speaking with someone who can generate
points on the line. Thus Alice must know the slope of the line, which
is the secret quantity m.
An important feature of this protocol is that it can be performed
only once per line. For example, if Bob knows any two points (x0, yo)
and (x, yi) on the line, he can compute the slope of the line using
the familiar "rise over ran" formula
m - (yo -yi) / (x - x) (mod q),
and this slope is the secret quantity m. That is why a new intercept
must be generated each time a message is sent. This is known as the
two-points-on-a-line principle. This feature will be useful for electronic
cash protocols, because we want to define a spending procedure that
reveals nothing of a secret key if used once per coin, but reveals the
key if a coin is spent twice.
Schnorr identification. The above protocol can be used for identifica-
tion of users in a network. Each user is issued a key pair, and each
public key is advertised as belonging to a given user. To identify
herself, a user need prove only that she knows her secret key. This
can be accomplished using the above zero-knowledge proof, because
her public key is linked with her identity.
Schnorr Signature. It is easy to convert the Schnorr identification
protocol to produce a digital signature scheme. Rather than receiving
a challenge from an on-line verifier, the signer simply takes x to be a
secure hash of the message and of the shadow of the line. This
proves knowledge of his secret key in a way that links his key pair to
the message.
Blind Schnorr Signature. Suppose that Alice wants to obtain a blind
Schnorr signature for her coin, which she will spend with Bob. Alice
generates random quantities (mod q) which describe a change of
variables. This change of variables replaces the Bank's hidden line
with another line, and the point on the Bank's line with a point on
the new line. When Bob verifies the Bank's signature, he is checking
the new point on the new line. The two lines have the same slope,
so that the Bank's signature will remain valid. When the Bank
receives the coin for deposit, it will see the protocol implemented on
the new line, but it will not be able to link the coin with Alice's
withdrawal because only Alice knows the change of variables relating
the two lines.
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Chaum-Pedersen Signature. A variant of Schnorr's signature scheme
is used in electronic cash protocols.1 2 This modified scheme is a
kind of "double Schnorr" scheme. It involves a single line and point
but uses two shadows. This signature scheme can be blinded in a way
similar to the ordinary Schnorr signature.
Implementations of the Schnorr Protocols. The Schnorr algorithms have
been described in terms of integers modulo a prime p. The proto-
cols, however, work in any setting in which the analogue of the
discrete logarithm problem is difficult. An important example is that
of elliptic curves.13 Elliptic curve based protocols are much faster
and require the transmission of far less data than non-elliptic
protocols giving the same level of security.
C. Summary of Proposed Implementations
Part C presents summaries of the three main off-line cash schemes:
Chaum-Fiat-Naor, 4 Brands,
5 and Ferguson. 16
Chaum-Fiat-Naor was the first electronic cash scheme, and is the
simplest conceptually. The Bank creates an electronic coin by
performing a blind RSA signature to Alice's withdrawal request, after
verifying interactively that Alice has included her identifying informa-
tion on the coin. The prevention of multiple spending is accom-
plished by the cut-and-choose method. For this reason, the scheme
is relatively inefficient.
Brands' scheme is Schnorr-based. 17 Indeed, a Schnorr protocol is
used twice: at withdrawal the Bank performs a blind Chaum-Pedersen
signature, and then Alice performs a Schnorr possession proof as the
challenge-and-response part of the spending protocol.
The withdrawal step produces a coin that contains the Bank's
signature, authenticating both Alice's identifying information and the
shadow of the line to be used for the possession proof. This commits
Alice to using that particular line in the spending step. If she re-
spends the coin, she must use the same line twice, enabling the Bank
to identify her.
12. See David Chaum & Torben P. Pedersen, Wallet Databases With Observers, 1992
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY--CRYPTO '92, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER Sd. 89, 93-94.
13. See MENEZES, supra note 7, at 13.
14. See David Chaum et al., Untraceable Electronic Cash, 1988 ADVANCES IN
CRYPTOLOGY-CRYPTO '88, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER Sci. 319.
15. See Stefan Brands, Untraceable Off-line Cash in Wallets with Observers, 1993 ADVANCES
IN CRYPTOLOGY-CRYPTO '93, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER ScI. 302.
16. See Niels Ferguson, Single Term Off-line Coins, 1993 ADVANCES IN
CRYPToLoGY-EUROCRYPT '93, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER Sci. 318.
17. For ease of exposition, we give a simplified account of Brands' protocol.
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The Brands scheme is considered by many to be the best of the
three, for two reasons: (1) it avoids the awkward cut-and-choose
technique; and (2) it is based only on the Schnorr protocols, and this
can be implemented in various settings such as elliptic curves.
Ferguson's scheme is RSA-based like Chaum-Fiat-Naor, but it uses
the "two-points-on-a-line" principle like Brands. The signature it uses
is not the blind RSA signature as described above, but a variant called
a randomized blind RSA signature. The ordinary blind RSA scheme
has the drawback that the Bank has absolutely no idea what it is
signing. As mentioned above, this is not a problem in the cut-and-
choose case, but in this case it can allow a payer to defeat the
mechanism for identifying multiple spenders. The randomized
version avoids this problem by having both Alice and the Bank
contribute random data to the message. The Bank still does not
know what it is signing, but it knows that the data was not chosen
maliciously. The rest of the protocol is conceptually similar to
Brands' scheme. The message to be signed by the Bank contains, in
addition to the random data, the shadow of a line the slope and
intercept of which reveal Alice's identity. During payment, Alice
reveals a point on this line; if she does so twice, the Bank can identify
her. Although Ferguson's scheme avoids the cut-and-choose tech-
nique, it is the most complicated of the three (due largely to the
randomized blind RSA signature). Moreover, it cannot be implement-
ed over elliptic curves because it is RSA-based.
IV. OPTIONAL FEATURES OF OFF-LINE CASH
Part IV discusses two features that can be added to off-line cash to
make it more convenient to use.
A. Transferability
Transferability is a feature of paper cash that allows a user to spend
a coin that he has received in a payment without having to contact
the Bank first. A payment is referred to as a transfer if the payee can
use the received coin in a subsequent payment. A payment system is
transferable if it allows at least one transfer per coin. Figure 2 shows
a maximum length path of a coin in a system that allows two transfers.
The final payment is not considered a transfer because it must be
deposited by the payee. Transferability would be a convenient feature
for an off-line cash system because it requires less interaction with the
Bank. It should be noted that a transferable electronic cash system
is off-line by definition, as on-line systems require communication with
the Bank during each payment.
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1st transfer
Alice Ted Carol Bob
Figure 2. A maximum length path of a coin in a system which allows 2 transfers per coin.
Transferable systems have received little attention in academic
literature. The schemes presented in Part III.C are not transferable
because the payee cannot use a received coin in another payment; his
only options are to deposit or exchange it for new coins at the Bank.
Any transferable electronic cash system has the property that the coin
must "grow in size" (i.e., accumulate more bits) each time it is spent,
because the coin must contain information about every person who
has spent it so that the Bank maintains the ability to identify multiple
spenders." This growth makes it impossible to allow an unlimited
number of transfers. The maximum number of transfers allowed in
any given system will be limited by the allowable size of the coin.
Other concerns with any transferable electronic cash system exist,
even if the number of transfers per coin is limited, and the anonymity
property is removed. Until the coin is deposited, the only informa-
tion available to the Bank is the identity of the individual who
originally withdrew the coin. Any other transactions involving that
withdrawal can be reconstructed only with the cooperation of each
consecutive spender of that coin. This poses the same problems that
paper cash poses for detecting money laundering and tax evasion: no
records of the transactions are available.
18. Seegenerally David Chaum &Torben P. Pedersen, Transferred Cash Grows in Size, 1992
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY-EUROCRYPT '92, LECTURE NOTEs IN COMPUTER SCl. 390.
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In addition, each transfer delays detection of re-spent or forged
coins. Multiple spending will not be noticed until two copies of the
same coin eventually are deposited. By then it may be too late to
catch the culprit, and many users may have accepted counterfeit
coins. Detection of multiple spending after the fact, therefore, may
not provide a satisfactory solution for a transferable electronic cash
system. Rather, a transferable system may have to rely on physical
security to prevent multiple spending."
B. Divisibility
Suppose that Alice is enrolled in a non-transferable, off-line cash
system, and she wants to purchase an item from Bob that costs $4.99.
If she happens to have electronic coins the value of which adds up to
exactly $4.99 then she simply spends these coins. Unless Alice has
stored a large reserve of coins of each possible denomination,
however, it is unlikely that she will have the exact change for most
purchases. She may not wish to keep such a large reserve of coins on
hand for some of the same reasons an individual does not carry
around a large amount of cash: lossof interest and fear of the cash
being stolen or lost. Another option is for Alice to withdraw a coin
of the exact amount for each payment, but that requires interaction
with the Bank, making the payment on-line from her point of view.
A third option is for Bob to pay Alice the difference between her
payment and the $4.99 purchase price. This puts the burden of
having an exact payment on Bob, and also requires Alice to contact
the Bank to deposit the "change."
A solution to Alice's dilemma is to use divisible coins: coins that
can be "divided" into pieces the total value of which is equal to the
value of the original coin. This allows exact off-line payments to be
made without the need to store a supply of coins of different
denominations. Paper cash obviously is not divisible, but lack of
divisibility is not as much of an inconvenience with paper cash
because it is transferable. Coins that are received in one payment can
be used again in the next payment, so the supply of different
denominations is partially replenished with each transaction.
Three divisible off-line cash schemes have been proposed, but at
the cost of longer transaction time and additional storage.
Eng/Okamoto's divisible scheme is based on the "cut and choose"
19. See infra Part VA
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method." Okamoto's scheme is much more efficient and is based
on Brands' scheme but also will work on Ferguson's scheme.'
Okamoto and Ohta's scheme is the most efficient of the three, but
also the most complicated.22 It relies on the difficulty of factoring
and on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.
level 0$
level 1 $2ode
level 2 ~ $1 1
odr 4 des node 6 node 7
Figure 3. A binary tree for a divisible coin worth $4.00, with a minimum
unit of $1.00. A $3.00 payment can be made by spending the shaded nodes.
Node 1 cannot be used in a subsequent payment because it is an ancestor of
nodes 2 and 6. Nodes 4 and 5 cannot be used because they are descendants
of node 2. Node 3 cannot be used because it is an ancestor of node 6. Nodes 2
and 6 cannot be used more than once, so node 7 is the only node which can
be spent in a subsequent payment.
All three of these schemes work by associating a binary tree with
each coin of value $w. Each node is assigned a monetary value as
follows: the unique root node (the node at level 0) has value $w, the
two nodes at level 1 each have value $w/2, the four nodes at level 2
each have value $w/4, etc. Therefore, if w = 2', then the tree has 1+1
levels, and the nodes at level j each have value $w/2. The leaves of
the tree are the nodes at level , and have the minimum unit of value.
To spend the entire amount of value $w, the root node is used.
Amounts less than $w can be spent by spending a set of nodes the
values of which add up to the desired amount.
Initially, any whole dollar amount up to $w can be spent. Subse-
quent payments are made according to the following rules:
20. See Tony Eng & Tatsuaki Okamoto, Single-Term Divisib Electronic Coins, 1994
ADvANcES IN CRYPTOLOGY-EUROCRYPT '94, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SGI. 311, 313.
21. See generally Tatsuaki Okamoto, An Eficient Divisible Electronic Cash Scheme, 1995
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY-CRYPTO '95, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER Sci. 438.
22. See generally Tatsuaki Okamoto & Kazuo Ohta, Universal Electronic Cash, 1991
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY-CRYPTO '91, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER Sci. 324.
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(1) Once a node is used, none of its descendant and ancestor
nodes" can be used; and
(2) No node can be used more than once.
These two rules ensure that no more than one node is used on any
path from the root to a leaf. If these two rules are observed, then it
will be impossible to spend more than the original value of the coin.
If either of these rules are broken, then two nodes on the same path
are used, and the information in the two corresponding payments can
be combined to reveal the identity of the individual who over-spent
in the same way that the identity of a multiple spender is revealed.
More specifically, in the Eng/Okamoto and Okamoto schemes,
each user has a secret value s, which is linked to his identity.
Uncovering s will uncover the user's identity, but not vice-versa. Each
node i is assigned a secret value, ti. Thus, each node i corresponds to
a line
y = sx + ti .
When a payment is made using a particular node n, t will be revealed
for all nodes i that are ancestors of node n. The payee then sends a
challenge xi and the payer responds with
Yl = sx + t..
This reveals a point (x, yj) on the line y = sx + t,, but does not reveal
the line itself. If the same node is spent twice, then responses to two
independent challenges, x, and x2, will reveal two points on the same
line: (x, yj) and (x2, _)- The secret value s can be recovered using
the two-points-on-a-line principle described in Part III.B.
If someone tries to overspend a coin, then two nodes in the same
path will be used. Suppose that nodes n and m are in the same path,
and node n is farther from the root on this path. Spending node n
will reveal t.n, because node m is an ancestor of node n. If node m
also is spent, then the response to a challenge x, will be yi = sx, + tn.
But t. was revealed when t, was spent, so sx and hence s will be
revealed. Therefore, spending two nodes in the same path will reveal
the identity of the over-spender. The Okamoto/Ohta divisible
scheme also uses a binary tree with the same rules for using nodes to
prevent multiple and over-spending, but when nodes are used
improperly, a different technique is used to determine the identity of
the spender. Instead of hiding the user's identifying secret in a line
23. A descendant of a node n is a node on a path from node n to a leaf. An ancestor
of node n is a node on the path from node n to the root node.
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for which a point is revealed when a coin is spent, the user's
identifying secret is hidden in the factorization of an RSA modulus.
Spending the same node twice, or spending two nodes on the same
path will provide enough information for the Bank to factor the
modulus (which is part of the coin) and then to compute the user's
secret identifying information.
Although these three divisible schemes are untraceable, payments
made from the same initial coin may be "linked" to each other,
meaning that it is possible to tell if two payments came from the same
coin and thus the same person. This does not reveal the payer's
identity if both payments are valid (following Rules 1 and 2, supra),
but revealing the payer's identity for one purchase would reveal that
payer's identity for all other purchases made from the same initial
coin.
Although providing divisibility complicates the protocol, it can be
accomplished without forfeiting untraceability or the ability to detect
improper spenders using any of these schemes. The most efficient
divisible scheme has a transaction time and required memory per coin
proportional to the logarithm of N, where N is the total coin value
divided by the value of the minimum divisible unit. More improve-
ments in the efficiency of divisible schemes are expected, as the most
recent improvement was presented in 1995.
V. SEcuRrTY ISSUES
Part V discusses some issues concerning the security of electronic
cash. First, Parts A and B discuss ways to prevent multiple spending
in off-line systems and describe the concept of wallet observers. Part
C discusses the consequences of an unexpected failure in the system's
security. Finally, Part D describes a solution to some of the law
enforcement problems that are created by anonymity.
A. Multiple Spending Prevention
Part I.D explained that multiple spending can be prevented in on-
line payments by maintaining a database of spent electronic coins, but
there is no cryptographic method for preventing an off-line coin from
being spent more than once. Instead, off-line multiple spending is
detected when the coin is deposited and compared to a database of
spent coins. Even in anonymous, untraceable payment schemes, the
identity of the multiple-spender can be revealed when the abuse is
detected. Detection after the fact may be enough to discourage
multiple spending in most cases, but it will not solve the problem. If
someone were able to obtain an account under a false identity, or
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werewilling to disappear after re-spending a large sum of money, he
could cheat the system successfully.
One way to minimize the problem of multiple spending in an off-
line system is to set an upper limit on the value of each payment
This would limit the financial losses to a given merchant from
accepting coins that had been deposited previously. However, this will
not prevent someone from spending the same small coin many times
in different places.
In order to prevent multiple spending in off-line payments, one
must rely on physical security. A "tamper-proof' card could prevent
multiple spending by removing or disabling a coin once it is spent.
Unfortunately, a truly "tamper-proof' card does not exist. Instead, we
will refer to a "tamper-resistant" card that physically is constructed so
that it is very difficult to modify its contents. This could be in the
form of a smart card, a PCMCIA card, or any storage device contain-
ing a tamper-resistant computer chip. A tamper-resistant card will
prevent abuse in most cases, because the typical criminal will not have
the resources to modify the card. Even with a tamper-resistant card,
however, it still is essential to provide cryptographic security to
prevent counterfeiting and to detect and identify multiple spenders
if the tamper-protection somehow is defeated. Additionally, setting
limits on the value of off-line payments would reduce the cost-
effectiveness of tampering with the card.
Tamper-resistant cards also can provide personal security and
privacy to the cardholder by making it difficult for adversaries to read
or modify the information stored on the card, such as secret keys,
algorithms, or records.
B. Wallet Observers
All of the basic off-line cash schemes presented in Part III.C can
cryptographically detect the identity of multiple spenders, but the only
way to prevent off-line multiple spending is to use a tamper-resistant
device such as a smart card. One drawback of this approach is that
the user must put a great deal of trust in the device, because the user
loses the ability to monitor information entering or leaving the card.
It is conceivable that the tamper-resistant device could leak private
information about the user without the user's knowledge.
Chaum and Pedersen proposed the idea of embedding a tamper-
resistant device into a user-controlled outer module in order to
achieve the security benefits of a tamper-resistant device without
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requiring the user to trust the device.24 They call this combination
an electronic wallet. The outer module (such as a small hand-held
computer or the user's PC) is accessible to the user. The inner
module, which cannot be read or modified, is called the "observer."
All information that enters or leaves the observer must pass through
the outer module, allowing the user to monitor information that
enters or leaves the card. The outer module, however, cannot
complete a transaction without the cooperation of the observer. This
gives the observer the power to prevent the user from making
transactions that it does not approve of, such as spending the same




Figure 4. An electronic wallet.
Brands and Ferguson both have shown how to incorporate
observers into their respective electronic cash schemes to prevent
multiple spending. 5 Brands' scheme incorporates observers in a
much simpler and more efficient manner. In Brands' basic scheme,
the user's secret key is incorporated into each of his coins. When a
coin is spent, the spender uses his secret key to create a valid
response to a challenge from the payee. The payee will verify the
response before accepting the payment. Using Brands' scheme with
wallet observers, this user-secret key is shared between the user and
his observer. The combined secret is a modular sum of the two
shares, so that one share of the secret reveals no information about
the combined secret. Cooperation of the user and the observer is
necessary to create a valid response to a challenge during a payment
transaction. This is accomplished without either the user or the
observer revealing any information about its share of the secret to the
24. See Chaum & Pedersen, supra note 12, at 92-93.
25. See generally Brands, supra note 15; Niels Ferguson, Extensions of Singe-term Coins,
1993 ADvANCEs IN CRYPTOLOGY, LECTURE NOTEs IN COMPUTER SCi. 292.
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other. It also prevents the observer from controlling the response;
thus the observer cannot leak any information about the spender.
An observer also could be used to trace the user's transactions at a
later time, as it can keep a record of all transactions in which it
participates. However, this requires that the Bank (or whoever is
doing the tracing) be able to obtain the observer and analyze it. Also,
not all types of observers can be used to trace transactions. Brands
and Ferguson both claim that they can incorporate observers into
their schemes and still retain untraceability of the users' transactions,




In any cryptographic system, there is some risk of a security failure.
Such a failure in an electronic cash system would result in the ability
to forge or duplicate money. There are a number of different ways
in which an electronic cash system could fail.
One of the most serious types of failure would occur if the cryptog-
raphy (the protocol or the underlying mathematics) does not provide
the intended security.2" This could enable someone to create valid
looking coins without knowledge of an authorized bank's secret key,
or to obtain valid secret keys without physical access to them. Anyone
who is aware of the weakness could create coins that appear to come
from a legitimate bank in the system.
Another serious type of failure could occur in a specific implemen-
tation of the system. For example, if the bank's random number
generator is not a good one, an individual may be able to guess the
secret random number and use it to compute the secret keys that are
used to create electronic money.
Even if the cryptography and the implementation are secure, the
security could fail because of a physical compromise. If a computer
hacker, a thief, a dishonest bank employee, or a rogue state were to
gain access to the bank's secret key it could create counterfeit money.
If it gains access to a user's secret key it could spend that user's
money. If it modifies the user or bank's software they could destroy
the security of the system.
26. The authors are unaware of anything in the literature that would suggest this type
of failure with the protocols discussed in this Essay.
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The above failure scenarios apply not only to the electronic cash
system, but also to the underlying authentication infrastructure. Any
form of electronic commerce depends heavily on the ability of users
to trust the authentication mechanisms. If, for example, an attacker
could demonstrate a forgery of the certification authority's digital
signature, it would undermine the users' trust in the ability of the
parties to identify each other. Thus, certification authorities must
secured as thoroughly as banks.
2. Consequences of a failure
All three of the basic schemes described in this Essay are anony-
mous, which makes it impossible for anyone to connect a deposited
coin to the originating bank's withdrawal record of that coin. This
property has serious consequences in the event of a security failure
leading to token forgery. When a coin is submitted for deposit, it is
impossible to determine if it is forged. Even the originating bank is
unable to recognize its own coins, preventing detection of the
compromise. It is conceivable that the compromise will not be
detected until the bank realizes that the total value of deposits of its
electronic cash exceeds the amount that it has created with a
particular key. At this point the losses could be devastating,
After the key compromise is discovered, the bank still will be unable
to distinguish valid coins from invalid ones, as deposits and withdraw-
als cannot be linked. The bank would have to change its secret key
and invalidate all coins that were signed with the compromised key.
The bank can replace coins that have not been spent yet, but the
validity of untraceable coins that already have been spent or deposited
cannot be determined without cooperation of the payer. Payment
untraceability prevents the Bank from determining the identity of the
payer, and payer anonymity prevents even the payee from identifying
the payer.
It is possible to minimize this damage by limiting the number of
coins affected by a single compromise. This could be done by
changing the Bank's public key at designated time intervals, or when
the total value of coins issued by a single key exceeds a designated
limit. This kind of compartmentation, however, reduces the
anonymity by shrinking the pool of withdrawals that could correspond
to a particular deposit and vice versa.
D. Restoring Traceability
The anonymity properties of electronic cash pose several law
enforcement problems because they prevent withdrawals and deposits
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from being linked to each other. Part C explained how this linking
problem prevents detection of forged coins. Anonymity also makes
it difficult to detect money laundering and tax evasion because there
is no way to link the payer and payee. Finally, electronic cash paves
the way for new versions of old crimes such as kidnapping and
blackmail27 where money drops now can be carried out safely from
the criminal's home computer.2"
One way to minimize these concerns is to require large transactions
or large numbers of transactions in a given time period to be
traceable. This would make it more difficult to commit crimes
involving large sums of cash. Even a strict limit such as a maximum
of $100 a day on withdrawals and deposits can add up quickly,
however, especially if one can open several accounts, each with its
own limit. Also, limiting the amount spent in a given time period
would have to rely on a tamper-resistant device.
Another way to minimize these concerns is to provide a mechanism
to restore traceability under certain conditions, such as a court order.
Traceability can be separated into two types by its direction. Forward
traceability is the ability to identify a deposit record (and thus the
payee), given a withdrawal record (and thus the identity of the payer).
In other words, if a search warrant is obtained for Alice, forward
tracing will reveal where Alice has spent her cash. Backward
traceability is the ability to identify a withdrawal record (and thus the
payer), given a deposit record (and thus the identity of the payee).
Backward tracing will reveal who Alice has been receiving payments
from.
A solution that conditionally restores both forward and backward
traceability into the cut-and-choose scheme is presented by Stadler,
Piveteau, and Camenisch. 9 In the basic cut-and-choose scheme, an
identifying number is associated with each withdrawal record and a
different identifying number is associated with each deposit record,
although there is no way to link these two records to each other. To
provide a mechanism for restoring backward traceability, the
withdrawal number (along with some other data that cannot be
associated with the withdrawal) is encrypted with a commonly trusted
entity's public key and incorporated into the coin itself. This
27. See Sebastiaan von Solms & David Naccache, On Blind Signatures and Perfect Crimes,
11 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 581, 582-83 (1992).
28. This Essay does not focus on such crimes against individuals, concentrating instead
on crimes against the government, the banking system, and the national economy.
29. See generally Markus Stradler et al., Fair Blind Signatures, 1995 ADVANCES IN
CRmvoLoGY-EUROCRYPT '95, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER Sci. 209.
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encrypted withdrawal number is passed to the payee as part of the
payment protocol, and then passed along to the bank when the coin
is deposited by the payee. The payer performs the encryption during
the withdrawal transaction, but the bank can insure that the encryp-
tion was done properly. If the required conditions for tracing are
met, the payment or deposit can be turned over to the trusted entity
holding the secret key to decrypt the withdrawal number. This
withdrawal number will allow the bank to access its withdrawal
records, identifying the payer.
To provide a mechanism for restoring forward traceability, the
payer must commit to a deposit number at the time that the coin is
withdrawn. The payer encrypts this deposit number with a commonly
trusted entity's public key (along with some other data that cannot be
associated with the deposit) and must send this value to the bank as
part of the withdrawal protocol. The bank is able to determine that
the payer has not cheated, although it only sees the deposit number
in encrypted form. If the required conditions for tracing are met, the
withdrawal record can be turned over to the trusted entity holding the
secret key to decrypt the deposit number. The bank can use this
deposit number to identify the depositor (the payee).
Stadler, Piveteau, and Camenisch have shown that it is possible to
provide a mechanism for restoring traceability in either or both
directions. This can be used to provide users with anonymity, while
solving many of the law enforcement problems that exist in a totally
untraceable system. The ability to trace transactions in either
direction can help law enforcement officials catch tax evaders and
money launderers by revealing who has paid or who has been paid by
the suspected criminal. Electronic blackmailers can be caught
because the deposit numbers of the victim's ill-gotten coins could be
decrypted, identifying the blackmailer when the money is deposited.
The ability to restore traceability does not solve one very important
law enforcement problem, namely detecting forged coins. Backward
tracing will help identify a forged coin if a particular payment or
deposit (or depositor) is under suspicion. In that case, backward
tracing will reveal the withdrawal number, allowing the originating
bank to locate its withdrawal record and to verify the validity of the
coin. If a forged coin makes its way into the system, however, it may
not be detected until the bank whose money is being counterfeited
realizes that the total value of its electronic cash deposits using a
particular key exceeds the values of its withdrawals. The only way to
determine which deposits are genuine and which are forged would
require obtaining permission to decrypt the withdrawal numbers for
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each deposit of electronic cash using the compromised key. This
would violate the privacy that anonymous cash was designed to
protect.
Unfortunately, the Stadler-Piveteau-Camenisch scheme is not
efficient because it is based on the bulky cut-and-choose method.
However, it may be possible to apply similar ideas to restore traceabili-
ty in a more efficient electronic cash scheme.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has described several innovative payment schemes that
provide user anonymity and payment untraceability. These electronic
cash schemes have cryptographic mechanisms in place to address the
problems of multiple spending and token forgery. Some serious
concerns about the ability of an electronic cash system to recover
from a security failure have been identified, however. Concerns about
the impact of anonymity on money laundering and tax evasion also
have been discussed.
Because it is simple to make an exact copy of an electronic coin, a
secure electronic cash system must have a way to protect against
multiple spending. If the system is implemented on-line, then
multiple spending can be prevented by maintaining a database of
spent coins and checking this list with each payment. If the system is
implemented off-line, then there is no way to prevent multiple
spending cryptographically, but it can be detected when the coins are
deposited. Detection of multiple spending after the fact is useful only
if the identity of the offender is revealed. Cryptographic solutions
have been proposed that will reveal the identity of the multiple
spender while preserving user anonymity.
Token forgery can be prevented in an electronic cash system as
long as the cryptography is implemented soundly and securely, the
secret keys used to sign coins are not compromised, and integrity is
maintained on the public keys. If there is a security flaw or a key
compromise, however, the anonymity of electronic cash will delay
detection of the problem. Even after the existence of a compromise
is detected, the Bank will not be able to distinguish its own valid coins
from forged ones. Because there is no way to guarantee that the
Bank's secret keys never will be compromised, it is important to limit
the damage that a compromise could inflict. This could be accom-
plished by limiting the total value of coins issued with a particular key.
Lowering these limits, however, also reduces the anonymity of the
system as there is a smaller pool of coins associated with each key.
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The untraceability property of electronic cash creates problems in
detecting money laundering and tax evasion because there is no way
to link the payer and payee. To counter this problem, it is possible
to design a system that has an option to restore traceability using an
escrow mechanism. If certain conditions are met (such as a court
order), a deposit or withdrawal record can be turned over to a
commonly trusted entity holding a key that can decrypt information
connecting the deposit to a withdrawal or vice versa. This will identify
the payer or payee in a particular transaction. It is not a solution to
the token forgery problem, however, because there may be no way to
know which deposits are suspect. In that case, identifying forged
coins would require turning over all of the Bank's deposit records to
the trusted entity to have the withdrawal numbers decrypted.
This Essay also has examined two optional features of off-line
electronic cash: transferability and divisibility. Because the size of an
electronic coin must grow with each transfer, the number of transfers
allowed per coin must be limited. Also, allowing transfers magnifies
the problems of detecting counterfeit coins, money laundering, and
tax evasion. Coins can be made divisible without losing any security
or anonymity features, but at the expense of additional memory
requirements and transaction time.
In conclusion, the potential risks in electronic commerce are
magnified when anonymity is present. Anonymity creates the
potential for large sums of counterfeit money to go undetected by
preventing identification of forged coins. Anonymity also provides an
avenue for laundering money and evading taxes that is difficult to
combat without resorting to escrow mechanisms. Anonymity can be
provided at varying levels, but increasing the level of anonymity also
increases the potential damages. It is necessary to weigh the need for
anonymity with these concerns. It may well be concluded that these
problems are best avoided by using a secure electronic payment
system that provides privacy, but not anonymity.
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